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Analysing the Links between National Capitals and Brussels in 
EU Foreign Policy

Abstract: The  article contributes to the study of EU foreign policy decision-making  
process by analysing the links between national officials working in the committees of  
the  Council  of  the  EU  and  their  capitals.  Through  an  original  database  of  138  
questionnaires (and 20 interviews) with national representatives, it explores the micro  
foundations of the formulation of EU foreign policy. It first shows how, even in this  
most intergovernmental field, diplomats in Brussels play a very important role in the  
policy process: for instance, only 30% affirm to always have a mandate; and one out  
of two report they do not feel restricted from their capital, and enjoy enough freedom  
in their  activities.  Next,  it  reveals that  if  (larger) member states attempt to retain  
control of CFSP/CSDP negotiations, the effective discretion/autonomy these officials  
enjoy depends on the experience accumulated in the decision-making process, and  
knowledge  of  the  (formal  and  informal)  links  between  Brussels  and  the  home  
department.
In recent years the study of the committees involved in the decision-making process 
of  the  European  Union  (EU)  has  proved  to  be  a  very  fruitful  area  of  research. 
Although  their  contribution  to  the  overall  workload  of  the  Council  of  the  EU 
(hereafter, the Council) may have been slightly exaggerated,1 these committees are 
said to settle approximately two thirds of all the issues on the Council agenda, and in 
relation to the plethora of functions they perform, they have been described as the 
‘backbone of the European system of integration’ (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 
98). 
This article contributes to the debates on the committees of the Council by analysing 
one overlooked aspect of their action (Häge 2007; Panke 2010) – the links between 
national  officials  working  in  these  committees  and  their  capitals.  In  particular,  it 
explores  the  micro  foundations  of  national  policy,  how  (and  by  whom)  national 
positions are prepared. How often do civil servants in Brussels have a mandate? To 
what extent do they enjoy leeway in their negotiations? What factors explain these 
dynamics? In spite of some empirical findings that increasingly reveal the important 
role played by the officials in Brussels (among others, Egeberg et al. 2003; Lewis 
1998;  Kassim et al.  2001), intergovernmental analysis of the Council has generally 
ignored  this  relationship.  The  state  is  a  unitary  actor  where  the  national  level 
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determines the position and diplomats in Brussels defend it. Somewhat surprisingly, 
the literatures on socialisation and on the ‘deliberative turn’ in EU studies also have 
failed  to  take  this  relation  into  account,  and bracketed  the  domestic  level.  If  EU 
committee members are socialised to a certain extent, what impact do these (partial) 
socialisation processes have on the negotiations of the Council? In other words, does a 
supranational identity held by individual national officials eventually translate into 
behavioural changes in states,  and how (Zürn and Checkel 2005)? Similarly,  how 
normative suasion can occur within these groups is unclear and often rests on implicit 
assumptions. How is it possible to argue that Council committees are arenas where 
diplomats  ‘reason,  discuss,  deliberate  and persuade’ (Niemann 2006:  468) without 
exploring  the  links  between  them  and  their  capitals?  One  may  even  argue  that 
deliberation between representatives is a contradiction in terms (Neyer 2006). Finally, 
investigating  the  control  of  the  capital  over  their  delegates  in  Brussels  appears 
valuable also from a normative perspective. The growing importance of committees 
within the Council and the EU raised serious concerns about the transparency and 
democratic accountability of the decision-making process (Christiansen and Kirchner 
2000; Rhinard 2002). As Häge puts it (2008: 556), the more closely national capitals 
are involved in the elaboration of the mandate, the less of an accountability deficit 
exists.2
Relying on an original dataset of 138 questionnaires and 20 interviews with national 
officials participating in the committees of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), this article attempts to 
partially fill this gap. In this perspective, it also contributes to our knowledge of how 
EU foreign policy is made. The ‘committee turn’ in EU studies has only partially 
addressed  the  area  of  foreign  policy.  If  some  contributions  have  examined  the 
historical  development  of  these  committees  in  the  CFSP  (e.g.,  Duke  and 
Vanhoonacker 2006), other analyses have also revealed that national foreign policies 
are often defined through social interaction in Brussels, and consensus-building is an 
essential feature of their negotiations (Juncos and Pomorska 2006; 2011; Juncos and 
Reynolds 2007; Howorth 2010). This article continues along these lines, by applying 
the  research  designs,  the  methodological  instruments  and  the  rigorous  testing  of 
hypotheses  widely  used  in  the  studies  of  the  Council  (Quaglia  et  al.  2008)  to 
CFSP/CSDP committees’ activities.
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The article is  organised as follows. The first  section clarifies and disentangles the 
European–national nexus in the preparation of the national position. Three dimensions 
are distinguished: a) the quantity and quality of the mandate; b) the relevance of the 
capital  for  diplomats’  activities;  and  c)  the  margin  of  officials’  autonomy. 
Furthermore, the dataset generated by the research is introduced and methodological 
issues are considered. The second section presents and discusses the empirical data for 
the three indicators, which allow us to assess the role of the European and national 
layers of the national administration in the formulation of the national position. The 
third  section  aims  at  deepening  the  analysis:  the  three  dimensions  are  used  as 
dependent variables, and a series of explanatory variables are introduced in order to 
explain the differences in the governments’ control over their diplomats in Brussels. 
Finally, the conclusion summarises the main findings and discusses their implications 
for wider debates about the study of European integration and EU foreign policy.
Links between Brussels and the National Capital
The article explores the links between officials in Brussels and the national capital, to 
determine the characteristics of their coordination, and to assess their relative power 
relationship.  As  mentioned,  studies  of  the  Council  –  which  have  generated  a 
remarkable amount of data – have rarely investigated these dynamics. Even when this 
is done, the context remains that of socialisation (Beyers and Trondal 2004; Beyers 
2005);  or  the  aim is  essentially  comparative  showing  the  many faces  of  the  EU 
committee governance (Egeberg et al. 2003). 
At the same time, the literature on EU foreign policy also has paid scarce attention to 
the European-domestic nexus. Broadly speaking, there are two different perspectives 
(ideal-types)  on  the  CFSP/CSDP  decision-making  process.  The  first  approach 
considers  the  CFSP as  an  intergovernmental  project  (Eliassen  1998;  Jones  2007), 
where member states attempt to promote their own interests (Allen 1996), national 
concerns take precedence, and a ‘logic of diversity’ prevents relevant agreements to 
be reached (Hoffmann 1966; Krotz 2009). The interplay between the European and 
domestic level is omitted, and the national capital is – implicitly more than explicitly 
–  assumed  to  formulate  the  position,  which  is  then  defended  and  maximised  in 
Brussels  by  national  diplomats.  A  second,  institutional,  perspective  identifies 
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consensus and problem-solving as key features of EU foreign policy, where solutions 
to policy problems are found in a collective definition of the issues, and references to 
European identity and interests and the use of peer pressure are common attributes 
(M.E.  Smith  2004).  The  major  role  is  said  to  be  played  by national  officials  in 
Brussels, who, socialised to European ideas and values, ‘see themselves … as policy 
arbiters’ (Tonra 2001:  12)  and form a  ‘diplomatic  republic  of  Europe’ (Jorgensen 
1997).  EU  foreign  policy  is  increasingly  Brusselized  and  formulated  by  national 
diplomats  in  the  Belgian  capital  (Juncos  and  Pomorska  2011).  The  interaction 
between Brussels and the capital,  however,  has not been analysed (cf. Juncos and 
Pomorska 2006 for an exception). Furthermore, these accounts  are mostly based on 
memoirs, unsystematic interviews and authorial insights. 
In other words, the micro foundations of the formulation of EU (foreign) policy are 
still largely left unexplored. Consequently, this article intends to analyse some aspects 
of the skeleton of the vertical coordination between the national and European layer 
of the national administration, and to provide the literature on committee governance 
and on the decision-making process of EU foreign policy with evidence at the micro 
level.
Three aspects are considered to define the links between Brussels and the capital and 
to evaluate  the practices and logics  behind the formulation and negotiation of the 
national position (Table 1). The first element is the quantity and quality of the national 
mandate. Mandate in this context refers to any formal or informal set of instructions 
or guidelines from the capital that the European level has to follow, represent and 
advance in EU negotiations. The characteristics of the mandate can shed light on how 
national and EU (foreign) policy are made. A mandate which is relatively little clear 
and detailed, would give diplomats participating in CFSP/CSDP committees a greater 
voice in formulating and representing the national position. Similarly, the absence of a 
mandate would imply that Brussels diplomats have, at times, a considerable amount 
of leeway in determining the position and can infuse CFSP/CSDP negotiations with 
their  own  perspectives.  By  contrast,  a  clearly  formulated,  detailed  and  frequent 
mandate generally3 reflects a high control of the domestic level over the activities of 
Brussels diplomats. The coordination of national policies, then, is highly centralised. 
Most  smaller  EU  states,  for  instance,  are  said  to  have  strongly  capital-based 
coordination  systems,  with  little  input  from  Permanent  Representations  (PRs): 
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Brussels diplomats send documents and information back to the capitals and just ‘wait 
for their instructions’ (Panke 2010: 773).  
The second defining feature concerns the source of information when diplomats nego-
tiate. The national level may influence the position to be defended in Brussels well 
beyond the mandate. Delegates are embedded in their domestic environment and even 
in the absence of negotiating instructions, they can still advance points of view, and 
use information and insights, elaborated more broadly by the capital. On the other 
hand, considering the national administration as (only) one of the sources for their 
activities, and taking into account information coming from the other member states 
or actors – such as, for instance, the European Commission or the High Representat-
ive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) – reveals a more fluid and dynamic 
dimension to the CFSP/CSDP negotiations than is often assumed. This could poten-
tially amount to more than a lowest common denominator of member states’ exogen-
ously defined positions, and could mean that they are  potentially subject to a more 
collective definition in Brussels by national officials.
TABLE 1
LINKS BETWEEN NATIONAL CAPITAL AND BRUSSELS
Operationalization Table
1) Quantity and quality of the mandate Questionnaire 2,3
2) Capital as source of information Questionnaire 4
3) Autonomy of the national officials Questionnaire 4
Following these observations, the third element that identifies the links between the 
capital and the European level is the overall leeway national representatives in Brus-
sels enjoy. Investigating to what extent they feel restricted by the national level in the 
negotiations  they  take  part  in4 sheds  further  light  on  the  role  the  domestic  and 
European layers of the national administration play in the formulation of the national 
position and negotiation of EU foreign and defence policy. Again, an extremely lim-
ited (perceived) margin of manoeuvre reveals a tight control of the capital and a mar-
ginal role of Brussels diplomats. CFSP/CSDP is still dictated and controlled by the 
capitals of member states. During negotiations diplomats enjoy little strategic leeway 
while, at best, they are allowed to drift away from the mandate only for tactical reas-
ons, with the explicit approval of the government. Since they are directly accountable 
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to their ministers (and ministries), their potential to act autonomously is limited (Häge 
2007: 310). On the other hand, a considerable (perceived) margin of manoeuvre in 
CFSP/CSDP negotiations would suggest that PRs have acquired a prominent part in 
EU decision-making process. The capital has become increasingly dependent on the 
European level. A process of Europeanisation of time may be under way (Ekengren 
and Sundelius 2004: 119) since the pace of the work in Council is so intense that na-
tional representatives often get the necessary documents at the very last minute (Ege-
berg et al. 2003). The ministry simply does not have the time to process them, and 
eventually instruct  its  delegates  in  Brussels.  In  this  vein,  EU foreign and defence 
policy is increasingly shaped in Brussels by national representatives, more easily per-
meated by their perspectives, and potentially formulated according to common defini-
tions of issues and problems.
In  order  to  analyse  and  test these  three  dimensions,  all5 the  national  diplomats 
involved in the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process have been considered and are 
the population of the research. A closed-ended questionnaire has been administered to 
the  about  30 CFSP and CSDP working groups,  Political  and Security Committee 
(PSC), Relex Counsellors, EU Military Committee, etc. The response rate was 36%: 
114 questionnaires were received by mail and another 24 were compiled online (for a 
total number of 138). Data from all the 27 member states were collected. In addition, 
20 in-depth interviews with national officials were conducted to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of certain issues and to better interpret the quantitative data.6 
Empirical Analysis
Presenting the Data
a) Quantity and Quality of the Mandate. The national mandate appears clear: 62.7% 
assigned a particularly high value (options 5+6) and a further 24.8% attributed a score 
of four. The domestic oversight appears instead more limited in relation to the level of 
detail: about 40% agreed that the instructions they received were not detailed and only 
7.3% regarded them as extremely detailed (Table 2).
TABLE 2
CLEARNESS; DETAIL (PERCENTAGE)
6
‘The instructions coming from my 
department are clear’
‘The instructions coming from my 
department are detailed’
1 3.7 2.2
2 2.9 21.9
3 5.8 16.1
4 24.8 27.0
5 40.1 25.6
6 22.6 7.3
Total 100 100
Scale from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 6 (‘strongly agree’)
At the same time, if the information flows and contacts between the European and 
domestic level are intense (71% report that they communicate with their department 
every day, and a further 25.4% fairly frequently),7 this communication is not one way: 
it is highly significant that civil servants do not receive instructions every time they 
meet  to  discuss  foreign  policy  issues  within  the  EU.  Less  than  one  of  three 
respondents indeed agree that they always have a national mandate, and 26.3% affirm 
to receive it ‘few times’ or ‘never’ (Table 3). 
TABLE 3
 FREQUENCY (PERCENTAGE)
‘Do you have negotiating instructions from your capital?’
1) Yes, always 30.7
2) Often 43.1
3) Few times 24.8
4) Never 1.5
Total 100.0
b) Relevance of the Capital as Source of Information. A further question explored the 
importance Brussels diplomats attach to their capital when they negotiate in Council 
committees.  Table  4  shows  that  the  national  capital,  unsurprisingly,  is  a  very 
important source of information (the cumulative percentage of the options ‘essential’ 
and ‘fairly important’ is 90.4%). This is unsurprising given that these officials are 
required to express the national point of view in those settings. 
The option ‘fairly important’, however, was the most frequently selected. The fact that 
46.3% chose  the  second  category  (and  a  further  9.6% the  third  or  fourth  reply) 
suggests that, the domestic level notwithstanding, national representatives’ opinions 
and positions are partly formed in different contexts and as a consequence of different 
dynamics. For instance, even if the decision-making process of the CFSP/CSDP is 
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centred on the Council, full-timers recognise that the Commission plays an important 
part  in  the  daily  management  of  the  CFSP/CSDP.  Nearly  70% (68.7%)  consider 
‘crucial’ or ‘important’ for their work the role of the Commission; only 7.5% replied 
saying that this role is negligible. Similar results are recorded regarding the influence 
of the HR (73.7% and 6%, respectively).8
TABLE 4.
CAPITAL AS SOURCE OF INFORMATION; AUTONOMY OF NATIONAL OFFICIALS (PERCENTAGE)
‘How important do you consider your capital as  
source of information for your negotiations?’
‘To what extent do you feel restricted by a  
negotiation mandate from your capital?’
1. Essential 44.1 1. Very much 12.4
2. Fairly important 46.3 2. Fairly enough 38.0
3. Little important 8.1 3. Not much, there is enough freedom 49.6
4. Not important at all 1.5 4. There is complete freedom 0.0
Total 100.0 Total 100.0
c)  Autonomy  of  the  National  Officials. These  data  indicate  that  the  source  of 
information is not exclusive (the capital). Ideas and positions of other actors can have 
an  impact  on  the  activities  of  national  representatives  in  Brussels.  Margins  of 
manoeuvre thus appear to exist: 49.6% of the interviewees report they do not feel 
restricted from their capital, and enjoy enough freedom in their negotiations (Table 4). 
This does not imply that Brussels diplomats play the major part in the CFSP decision-
making process. Furthermore, allowing a certain degree of freedom is often a rational 
strategy for member states to achieve their aims – provided that discretion is used to 
pursue exogenously given national interests – defined and closely monitored by the 
capital. What the data, however, reveal is that, at minimum, the control of the national 
level  on PRs is  not  as  strong as  some intergovernmentalists  may think;  they also 
indicate that these civil servants are able to often infuse, and influence, negotiations 
with their insights and perspectives. Finally, in-depth interviews suggest that, in some 
circumstances,  it  is  the  European branch that  determines  the  negotiating  position. 
Diplomats who work every day in Brussels ‘know the general atmosphere of their 
own group, and those positions and behaviours that can be accepted and those which 
are not.’9 They ‘sometimes have to face  advices and instructions that are outside of 
the  European  logic  and  also  counter-productive.’  In  these  situations,  it  occurs 
regularly that ‘colleagues call home to report that the initial position is not realistic’ 
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and that in order to reach a (reasonable) consensus, ‘it is necessary to change it.’10 
This  is  more  likely  to  happen  when  coordination  problems  within  the  national 
administration  exist,  when  the  ministries  of  Defence  and  Foreign  Affairs  hold 
conflicting policy stances, or when the issues are so technical that people at home do 
not have the necessary expertise nor time to analyse them. As a result, 40% of the 
respondents  indicate  that  convincing  their  national  administration  to  modify  a 
negotiating position is a recurrent event; cumulatively, 85.6% acknowledge that it has 
occurred sometimes in the groups they belong to (Table 5). 
TABLE 5
POSITION SHIFTS (PERCENTAGE)
‘Has it ever occurred that any member of your group, disagreeing with the  
position supported by her own department, acted so as to convince her capital?’
1. Yes, it occurs frequently 39.6
2. Yes, but it occurs rarely 46.3
3. No, it has never occurred 14.2
Total 100
Discussion
All these aspects reveal that the national capital did not disappear, and its control over 
CFSP/CSDP full-timers is effective, but surely not as tight as often assumed. The two 
levels are interconnected, and the formulation of the national position appears to be a 
combined activity. How can we interpret this relationship? A strict interpretation of a 
Principal-Agent (P-A) approach – on which many (intergovernmental) readings of the 
Council and the CFSP/CSDP rely – does not seem useful in this context. Identifying a 
clear  ‘principal’,  who  elaborates  the  national  preference,  and  an  ‘agent’,  who 
maximises  that  preference,  is  a  difficult  task  (Lewis  1998).  The  European  level, 
certainly well connected with the domestic bureaucratic structure, nevertheless enjoys 
a certain margin of (perceived) autonomy and possibility to advance its own views. 
This happens in two ways. First, the experience acquired in Brussels is a necessary 
element  to  define the content  of  the national  mandate.  The data  have shown that 
Brussels  diplomats  have  not  been  delegated  merely the  function  to  represent  and 
defend the position that is prepared by departments in the capital. The information 
flow is  two-way:  ‘interaction between the two levels  is  the key word,’ a  national 
official reveals.11 Only 30% claim to always have a mandate; in some cases it happens 
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that Brussels diplomats write instructions for themselves and then inform the ministry 
about what they are going to negotiate (Juncos and Pomorska 2011). As a CIVCOM 
delegate said, ‘instructions from capital are essentially based on proposals sent by the 
Permanent  Representation.’12 The subject  of the delegation is  thus wider  and also 
concerns the elaboration of (part of) the position. Second, Brussels bureaucrats are 
important players  in the negotiation process itself. They know how negotiations are 
structured and likely to evolve, and what resources are needed in that game. Given 
their central position and the information asymmetries that emerge between them and 
their superiors, participants in CFSP/CSDP committees have detailed information on 
the nature and intensity of other actors’ preferences, and know what is appropriate and 
possible to achieve in those settings.
These results are largely consistent with the findings of the volume edited by Kassim 
et  al.  (2001)  on  the  national  coordination  of  EU  policy  at  the  European  level. 
Employing a different methodology – case studies of eleven PRs – and concentrating 
essentially  on  the  European  Community,  their  analysis  demonstrates  how  PRs 
participate in the definition of the national position. As a French civil servant said (in 
Kassim and Peters 2001: 337), ‘I have been surprised, since my arrival [in Brussels], 
by the degree to which our work involves formulating policy with Paris as opposed to 
simply  executing  policies  formulated  in  Paris.’ However,  if  these  studies  mostly 
explored officials’ activity of information-gathering and de-briefing, this article has 
further illustrated the degree of discretion the participants in CFSP/CSDP committees 
enjoy  –  even  occasionally  convincing  their  own  capital  to  change  the  original 
position. Persuading the domestic level to accept a better argument raised by another 
member  state  would be  the  most  convincing  ‘smoking  gun’ for  a  supranational 
reading of the Council (Lewis 2008).
Not surprisingly, a final query fully confirms the image of a joint decision-making 
process  and blurred  boundaries  between  the  national  administration  and Brussels. 
Table 6 reveals that 75.6% of the interviewees give a well-balanced evaluation of their 
power relationship: the links are dynamic and open, and both levels contribute to the 
formulation of the national policy. Moreover, diplomats who consider the PRs to be 
the  principal  actors  are  more  numerous  than  those  who  support  a  strictly 
intergovernmental image of the Council.
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TABLE 6
OVERALL ASSESSMENT (PERCENTAGE)
‘How do you assess the overall power relationships between the officials in Brussels and those in the capital?’
1. It is an open and dynamic relation: both parts contribute to the formulation of the position 75.6
2. It is a basically unilateral relation: the national capital defines the position and Brussels defends it 8.1
3. Brussels plays the major part, as it is at the heart of the CFSP decision-making process 14.1
4. Other 2.2
Total 100.0
Advancing Some Explanatory Variables
The analysis so far has offered a general representation of the links between capitals 
and Brussels  in  EU foreign  and defence  policy.  However,  member  states  develop 
different institutional arrangements for coordinating European policy.  For instance, 
countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden, and France tend to exert tight control on 
their  civil  servants,  whereas  more  decentralised  coordination  systems  guarantee  a 
wide margin for manoeuvre for the representatives  of Luxembourg,  Belgium, and 
Italy (Kassim and Peters  2001;  Beyers  and Trondal  2004).  Even within  the  same 
country,  ministerial  control  can  change from issue  to  issue  (Fabbrini  and Piattoni 
2008).
Consequently, this section introduces and tests some variables to explain variation in 
the experiences of national servants. To evaluate control on the European level, the 
same three  elements  that  have  previously defined the  links  between the  domestic 
ministry and Brussels – a) the clearness, detail and frequency of the mandate; b) the 
relevance  of  the  capital  for  diplomats’ activities;  and  c)  the  margin  of  officials’ 
autonomy – are used here as outcome variables. First, explanatory elements linked to 
the  institutional  context  (Working  Groups versus  PSC;  CFSP versus  CSDP)  are 
investigated.  Next,  the analysis  statistically tests  variables  at  the  micro  level  (EU 
Career; Seniority) and macro level (Polity; Europeanism; Power).
The Institutional Context: Working Groups versus PSC
A research  design  widely used  by the  literature  on  EU committees  examines  the 
activities that take place in those settings through comparative lenses. The sample 
includes expert groups, Council working groups (CWGs) and comitology committees. 
This allows researchers to assess the results controlling for contextual factors, as these 
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groups  and  committees  have  different  degrees  of  politicization,  network 
characteristics and rules (Egeberg et al. 2003).  If different institutional contexts and 
affiliations lead to different experiences, ministerial control and bureaucratic leeway 
are  likely  to  vary  in  the  case  of  the  officials  participating  in  CWGs  and  of  the 
diplomats sitting in the PSC. Expectations are mixed. On the one side, CWGs deal 
with  CFSP dossiers  in  the  first  stages  of  the  decision-making  process,  and  their 
participants are often experts in that field. The capital could have fewer opportunities 
and incentives to control their work. Similarly, senior officials in the PSC are closer to 
the heart of the decision-making process: national priorities are likely to emerge here 
with greater force. On the other side, the PSC is a more senior and less transparent 
body; agreements are taken with minor involvement of external actors, including the 
capital. PSC representatives are thus expected to enjoy wider margins of manoeuvre.
The picture that emerges from the data13 is relatively clear: oversight by the national 
capital  is  stronger  in  the  case  of  CWGs.  All  the  statistics  (but  one,  where  the 
difference  is  nevertheless  small)  lead  to  the  same reading (Table  7).  Only 23.8% 
(26.9%) of the interviewees – compared with 42.3% (40.6%) of CWGs delegates – 
affirm, for instance, having a mandate when they negotiate in the PSC. Some officials 
who belong to, or have experience of, both groups confirm that in the PSC ‘there is 
greater freedom’, and ‘the government hand penetrates less deeply.’ Furthermore, PSC 
officials have a higher level of seniority (even an ambassadorial rank), which ensures 
greater autonomy.14 
The Institutional Context: CFSP versus CSDP
Another  institutional  factor  that  may  have  an  impact  on  the  activities  of  these 
committees concerns the different features and rules that characterise the CFSP and 
CSDP.  It  may well  be  that  these  two regimes  demand  different  coordination  and 
negotiating styles. Only national policy-makers, with their mandate legitimised at the 
domestic level, can launch a military operation and endanger their own soldiers’ lives. 
Accordingly, the national hold is likely to be stronger in defence policy. However, the 
data do not support this claim (Table 7). The statistics show relatively close and/or 
contrasting values. Instructions are clearer, but less detailed, for CSFP representatives. 
If CSDP officials pay more attention to the national level, the negotiating mandate 
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occurs  more  frequently  in  the  case  of  foreign  policy.  Finally,  there  are  not  big 
differences in the (perceived) margins of freedom between the two groups.
TABLE 7
CFSP WORKING GROUPS AND PSC; CFSP AND CSDP
CFSP CWGs PSC CFSP CSDP
N=43 N=27 N=51 N=21 N=94 N=59 N=76 N=54
Instructions are clearº 95.2% 100% 80.4% 85% 87.1% 93.3% 82.9% 87.1%
Instructions are detailedº 52.4% 53.8% 56.9% 55% 54.9% 56.9% 64.5% 68.5%
I ‘always’ have negotiating instructions¹ 40.6% 42.3% 26.9% 23.8% 34.4% 35.6% 27.6% 29.7%
The negotiating mandate is constraining² 47.6% 53.8% 46.2% 51.9% 46.8% 54.2% 48.7% 51.9%
The capital is the ‘essential’ source of 
information¹
42.9% 50% 38.5% 33.3% 42.6% 42.4% 47.3% 48.4%
º) Options 4+5+6 (6-point scale) 
¹) Option 1 (4-point scale)
²) Options ‘very much’ and ‘fairly enough’ (4-point scale)
Between Micro and Macro: More Explanatory Variables
The control of the capital on the activities of its officials in Brussels may depend on 
the individual  experiences of the officials  themselves:15 a greater number of years 
spent in the CFSP/CSDP can enhance their trust vis-à-vis the capital. Besides, people 
in PRs can use information and knowledge asymmetries to increase their autonomy 
(Kassim and Peters 2001: 307). Along similar lines, the same trust and negotiating 
leeway  can  be  generated  by  a  long  overall  career  in  national  ministries,  foreign 
embassies and PRs. Junior officials are more likely to be kept on a tight leash by their 
ministry (Howorth 2010). The hypotheses can be formulated as follows: the longer 
the career in European affairs (H1:  EU Career), the longer the overall career of a 
national diplomat (H2: Seniority), the less tight the control of the capital on Brussels 
will be.16 
On the other hand, some variables at the macro level can be tested to analyse their  
impact  on  the  domestic  oversight  of  Brussels  bureaucrats.  First,  the  level  of 
decentralization and the existence of a multi-level governance within a country can be 
positively associated with a  greater  discretion of national  officials  (H3:  Polity).  A 
more decentralised system of preference formation (with a bigger role assigned to 
PRs) is more easily accepted in a multi-layered constitutional culture (Beyers and 
Trondal 2004: 928-929).17
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Second, states  that share a widespread consensus on the benefits  of a EU foreign 
policy tend to rely more on their national servants in Brussels; at the same time, more 
lukewarm countries  employ  a  higher  number  of  officials  to  better  monitor  them 
(Kassim and Peters 2001: 327). To measure these orientations, two proxies are used: 
first, the attitude of the national elite towards the CFSP/CSDP (H4a: Elite). Research 
conducted  by  the  Commission  in  1996  on  top  decision-makers’ opinions  on  EU 
foreign  and  defence  policy  provides  the  necessary  information.  These  data  are 
available only for 15 countries. Consequently, information on public opinion is used 
(H4b: Public Opinion) to cover also those countries that joined the EU between 2004 
and 2007 (Eurobarometer surveys). 
Finally,  a  last  explanatory  variable  is  closely  related to  the  field  of  international 
relations and an intergovernmental reading of the CFSP/CSDP. A common (realist) 
assumption  is  that  the  most  powerful  states  have  fewer  interests  in  pooling  their 
sovereignty in such a delicate sector, as they are able to conduct independent foreign 
policies and prefer not to be tied by international/European commitments. As a result, 
they are expected to give more importance to the control of their own servants in 
Brussels, whereas smaller states’ representatives are likely to enjoy more leeway in 
their work (H5: Power).18
The five explanatory variables are summarised in Table 8. The three outcome vari-
ables (Frequency, Clearness, Detail of the Mandate;  Source;  Autonomy of the Offi-
cials.  See Table 1)  have a natural ordering, but the distance between levels is un-
known. As a result, an ordered probit regression is employed. On each of the outcome 
variables two different regressions are run: first, with the following explanatory vari-
ables (EU Career;  Seniority;  Public Opinion;  Power); next,  Polity  and  Elite are ad-
ded.19 The reason for this lies in the different N of the explanatory variables: as the re-
search selects a listwise approach,20 considering the data for just 15 countries would 
seriously limit the research. 
TABLE 8
BETWEEN MICRO AND MACRO: SOME EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Hypotheses Relation with greater  
negotiating autonomy
Relation with stricter  
national control
Operationalization
1) EU Career Positive Negative Questionnaire
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2) Seniority Positive Negative Questionnaire
3) Polity Positive Negative Hooghe-Marks index
4a) Elite
4b) Public Opinion
Positive Negative Eurobarometer
5) Power Negative Positive CIMC
Results
This section presents the results of the regression analyses (Table 9). Concerning the 
quantity and quality of the mandate they show a very clear picture. Only one variable 
turned out  to  be statistically significant:  the relative power of  EU member states. 
Ceteris  paribus,  more powerful states are more likely to prepare clearer and more 
detailed instructions for their delegates, and do it more often than smaller states. The 
control of larger (in terms of military capabilities) states on their representatives in 
Brussels is thus stricter. All six regressions yielded statistically significant results in 
the case of the Power variable. The intergovernmental expectation is confirmed also 
in the case of the second outcome variable: diplomats from larger member states are 
more likely to consider the capital as an important source for their negotiations. No 
other variable can explain the importance national officials attach to their capital. As 
the interpretation of coefficients of ordered probit models is not straightforward, the 
marginal effects (of only the variables that are significant) are reported (Table 10): 
they  indicate the effect of a one-unit increase in the independent variables (at their 
mean) on outcome variables. In particular, as Power is up by one point (from a mean 
of 7.5), probabilities of always receiving a mandate are expected to increase by almost 
3%. Similarly, probabilities of considering the capital as the essential source rise by 
3.6% (from a mean of 7.2).
Receiving  a  negotiating  mandate  more  often,  with  clearer  and  more  detailed 
instructions,  and  more  frequently  regarding  the  capital  as  the  essential  source  of 
negotiations, is expected to show a strong relationship between military power and the 
representatives’ leeway as well. Being monitored more closely, national servants from 
larger member states will have less discretion in their activities. The two regressions 
do not confirm this reading, however: in both cases the relationship is weak and not 
significant.  One  other  variable  explains  the  relative  freedom  of  CFSP/CSDP 
diplomats. Running the first regression, it emerges that those diplomats with a long 
career in the EU are more likely to have more space for manoeuvre than officials with 
limited  experience.  As  EU career is  increased by one  point  (from a mean of  2.9 
15
years), probabilities of feeling very much restricted by the national mandate decrease 
by 3.6%. On the other hand, national officials are more likely (by 7.4%) to sustain 
that  they enjoy enough freedom when negotiating  in  Council  committees  (from a 
mean of 4.2 years). Adding  Elite and  Polity, the relevance of the time spent in EU 
decision-making is confirmed.
Discussion
The regressions indicate that the relationship between capitals and Brussels can be 
explained by the military power of member states, and the years spent by diplomats in 
the EU decision-making process. How do we interpret these apparently contradictory 
results? In effect, the picture appears quite unambiguous: more powerful countries 
attempt to impose tighter control on EU foreign and defence policy. The neorealist 
expectation  that  larger  EU  states,  being  more  reluctant  to  delegate  or  pool  their 
sovereignty,  provide  their  delegates  with  more  frequent,  detailed  and  clear 
instructions, is confirmed. However, this stricter control does not seem to translate 
into the level of discretion enjoyed by national representatives. Once officials reach 
the stage of  negotiation,  the dynamics  that  determine their  amount  of  leeway are 
explained by another  factor.  Here,  the  factors  allowing them a  significant  role  in 
formulating the national position are cumulative experience gained, knowledge of EU 
and domestic contexts, and knowledge of their relative (formal and informal) codes of 
conduct. In the words of an official, ‘at the beginning you don’t realise when and how 
(and to what extent) you have a certain margin of manoeuvre in your committee … It 
is something that you learn over time, when you get to know the dynamics between 
Brussels and your own department.’21 Again, this allows them not just to relay back a 
great deal of information (and even relaying back may be selective), nor just to advise 
the capital on what positions are realistic, but also to formulate the national policy. In 
other words, if government input can be convincingly explained by the amount of 
power held by member states, the effective discretion/autonomy of diplomats depends 
on the time spent in the EU decision-making process.
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TABLE 9
RESULTS OF ORDERED PROBIT
Clearness  
(1st Regr.)
Clearness (2nd 
Regr.)
Detail (1st  
Regr.)
Detail (2nd 
Regr.)
Frequency (1st 
Regr.)
Frequency (2nd 
Regr.)
Source (1st 
Regr.)
Source (2nd 
Regr.)
Autonomy (1st 
Regr.)
Autonomy (2nd 
regr.)
Threshold
[=1,00]
[=2,00]
[=3,00]
[=4,00]
[=5,00]
-1.238
(.569)
-.944
(.546)
-.612
(.515)
.236
(.504)
1.369
(.492)
-2.292
(.660)
-1.985
(.646)
-1.622
(.680)
-.711
(.702)
.606
(.637)
-1.943
(.668)
-.598
(.594)
-.109
(.572)
.651
(.560)
1.633
(.547)
-3.712
(.731)
-2.080
(.615)
-1.639
(.583)
-.820
(.591)
.224
(.615)
-.586
(.799)
.647
(.793)
2.219
(.865)
– 
– 
.789
(.889)
2.082
(.918)
3.500
(.968)
– 
– 
-1.211
(.706)
.400
(.736)
1.314
(.868)
– 
– 
-.304
(.527)
1.210
(.633)
– 
– 
– 
-1.610
(.669)
-.502
(.661)
–
– 
–  
-1.362
(1.128)
-.138
(1.043)
– 
– 
– 
EU Career .033
(.039)
.033
(.053)
-.018
(.031)
-.052
(.038)
-.011
(.040)
.024
(.043)
.026
(.039)
.051
(.046)
.186**
(.060)
.184*
(.080)
Seniority -.001
(.009)
-.009
(.011)
-.011
(.009)
-.011
(.012)
.001
(.010)
.005
(.014)
.003
.010
.009
(.012)
.003
(.013)
.017
(.019)
Polity – .017
(.040)
– -.027
(.060)
– -.007
(.062)
– .014
(.061)
– .141
(.074)
Elite – -.089
(.112)
– -.211
(.117)
– .217
(.173)
– -.067
(.097)
– -.215
(.182)
Public Opinion .004
(.007)
– .002
(.008)
– .006
(.011)
– -.011
(.009)
– -.016
(.010)
–
Power .041*
(.016)
.043*
(.019)
.043*
(.016)
.045*
(.019)
-.083***
(.020)
-.071*
(.030)
-.092***
(.020)
-.051**
(.018)
.010
(.015)
-.009
(.019)
N 125 86 125 85 125 85 124 85 125 85
Notes. Standard errors (adjusted for clusters in Nationality) are reported in parentheses. *p < .05; **p <.01; ***p < .001.
TABLE 10. 
MARGINAL EFFECTS
Clearness (1st Regr.) Detail (1st Regr.) Frequency (1st Regr.) Source (1st Regr.) Autonomy (1st Regr.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
CINC -.003
(.002)
-.002
(.001)
-.003
(.002)
-.007*
(.003)
.004
(.002)
.012**
(.004)
-.002
(.001)
-.011*
(.004)
-.003*
(.003)
.002
(.002)
.009*
(.004)
.005**
(.002)
.029**
(.007)
-.004
(.004)
-.023***
(.006)
-.002
(.002)
.036***
(.008)
-.024***
(.006)
-.010**
(.003)*
-.002
(.002)
– – – –
EU 
career
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -.036**
(.011)
-.038* 
(.018)
.074** 
(.024)
–
  
Clearness (2nd Regr.) Detail (2nd Regr.) Frequency (2nd Regr.) Source (2nd Regr.) Autonomy (2nd Regr.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
CINC -.002
(.001)
-.002
(.001)
-.003
(.003)
-.009
(.005)
.003
(.002)
.012*
(.005)
-.001
(.001)
-.012*
(.005)
-.004
(.002)
-.000
(.002)
.010*
(.005)
.006*
(.002)
.028*
(.011)
-.011
(.006)
-.016**
(.006)
-.001
(.001)
.020**
(.007)
-.015*
(.006)
-.005*
(.002)
– – – – –
EU 
career
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -.028*
(.012)
-.044
(.024)
.072*
(.031)
–
*p < .05; **p <.01; ***p < .001
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Conclusion
Through an original database of 138 questionnaires (and 20 interviews) with national 
officials working in CFSP/CSDP committees, the article has offered a nuanced picture 
of the dynamics that characterise the formulation of the national position inside those 
settings.  The control of the centre over the representatives in Brussels is far from 
being  as  tight  as  a  strictly  intergovernmental  reading  of  the  EU  would  predict. 
Assuming  a  ‘unidirectional  causal  chain’ –  starting  with  the  domestic  level  ‘and 
translated through state to the national … positions which are then represented in 
Brussels negotiations’ (Lewis 2000: 265-266) – and the state as a unitary actor does 
not describe what happens in the CFSP/CSDP. The relationship of representatives in 
Council  committees  with  the  central  administration  is  open,  with  both  levels 
formulating the negotiating position. Furthermore, one out of two feel sufficiently free 
in the activities they take part in. These findings are even more revealing for the study 
of  the  Council  and  international  negotiations,  as  the  national  control  is  widely 
assumed to be at its strongest in foreign policy. Next, a few explanatory variables 
have  been  introduced  to  explain  the  different  coordination  efforts  of  the  capital: 
CWGs are  more  controlled  than  the  PSC,  while  there  have  not  been  appreciable 
differences  between  the  CFSP and  CSDP.  Variables  at  the  micro  level  (national 
officials’ experiences) and macro level (state characteristics)  have been tested:  the 
features of the mandate are explained by states’ military capabilities, and diplomats’ 
negotiating freedom by the years spent in the Council.  Future research should test 
these  variables  also  in  case  studies,  and explore  how they eventually combine  in 
single  policy  dossiers.  Other  factors  could  also  be  considered:  the  mandate  and 
representatives’ leeway may vary according to the nature (and salience) of the issue 
and to the type of CFSP/CSDP operation.
The results of this article are also relevant for theoretical reasons. For instance, they 
can offer useful insights to better analyse EU foreign and defence policy, and provide 
implications for the two different perspectives (intergovernmental and institutional) 
on the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process. In conclusion, three observations can be 
advanced.  First,  if  a  strictly  intergovernmental  image  of  the  formulation  of  the 
national position is contradicted, this does not indicate that intergovernmental studies 
do  not  explain  the  decision-making  process  of  the  Council  and  CFSP/CSDP.  For 
instance, showing that the definition of the position is a joint process does not mean 
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that  states  do  not  pursue  the  national  preference.  National  officials,  even  when 
enjoying  sufficient  leeway,  can  nevertheless  advance  their  own  interpretations  of 
broader national guidelines.22 However, opening up the black box of the state and 
admitting the possibilities for European inputs to inform negotiations pose remarkable 
challenges to an intergovernmental reading of the Council.
One way to take into account the evidence this article has offered would be to make a 
more nuanced and explicit use of a P-A approach. The capital delegates a much more 
significant and sensitive function: (part of) the preparation of the national position, 
and  not  only  its  negotiation  in  Brussels.  The  domestic  level  has  indeed  several 
incentives  to  delegate  such  a  function:  reducing  information  asymmetries, 
economizing on transaction costs, improving the efficiency of the national decision-
making process and the quality of the policy, etc. – thus saving capital’s time and 
resources.  After  all,  Brussels  delegates  are  national  public  servants  temporarily 
assigned to national PRs. However, several problems may arise in applying a P-A 
approach to this intra-bureaucratic delegation. First, the data seem to suggest that the 
two levels are increasingly blurred: it is often difficult to identify who is the principal 
and who is the agent. Second, principals should be aware of the act of the delegation – 
or at least, of its consequences and the importance of (credible) control mechanisms. 
Arguably, the mandate is the major control mechanism when the capital delegates the 
function of negotiating a certain policy. However, the design of delegation and control 
mechanisms is only loosely present when it comes to the (eventual) delegation of the 
elaboration of  the  position.  Third,  most  P-A  studies  consider  asymmetries  in 
preferences,  and incentive incompatibility,  between principal and agents as one of 
their core features (Miller 2005: 205) – which does not necessarily occur in the case 
of the capital  and PRs. Finally,  the fact that the most important source of agents’ 
autonomy is  not  related to  the control  mechanisms at  disposal  of  the  capital  (the 
mandate, for instance), but to the number of years spent in the Council challenges 
profoundly the validity of a P-A approach (Pollack 2007).
Second, in few cases institutional analyses have shown how and where socialisation 
and/or  deliberative processes  can impact  national  positions  inside the Council.  As 
mentioned in the introduction, the mechanisms remain at best implicit; the domestic 
level, and the national/supranational nexus, are absent, or bracketed. This article has 
demonstrated that the European level – far from being unconnected with the national 
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capital – nevertheless plays a relevant role in the formulation and negotiation of EU 
foreign  policy,  with  a  certain  level  of  discretion.  It  has  not  demonstrated  that  a 
problem-solving approach characterises the CFSP/CSDP decision-making process nor 
that specific member states’ policies have changed during negotiations. What has been 
indicated are the conditions for that to happen in several cases. The findings of this 
article can therefore provide a micro-foundation for these analyses of the Council and 
the CFSP/CSDP.
Finally, investigating the relationship between the ministry and Brussels may connect 
the literature on socialisation with Europeanisation studies (Müller and Alecu de Flers 
2009: 19-23). Scholars have traditionally focussed on long-term changes, often in the 
culture  and  identity  of  national  society  and  state  actors.  However,  there  are  two 
further avenues through which the EU ‘hits’ member states. Socialisation processes 
can change member states’ policies not only in the medium–long run, but also during 
the negotiation process  itself  (Checkel  1999).  Again,  the role  of  change agents  is 
played  by national  officials  who are  at  the  crossroads  of  domestic  and European 
settings. Finally, European input can enter the national decision-making process from 
the  outset:  as  an  Antici  counsellor  reported  (in  Lewis  1998:  491),  ‘[i]nstructions 
already contain a  big Brussels  element  in  them, and sometimes they are Brussels 
instructions  …  sometimes  they  just  copy  our  reports  into  instructions.’  If  the 
formulation of the national position is  shared between the domestic and European 
branches of the national administration, and if the latter is embedded in a European 
context  with  common  values  and  ideas,  European  elements  can  mould  and 
Europeanise  national  (foreign)  policy  through  diplomats  in  Brussels.  Although 
methodologically  difficult  to  detect,  this  Europeanisation  through  national 
representatives  can  nonetheless  be  an  important  feature  of  EU  decision-making 
dynamics.
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1 See  Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 40.  Using more sophisticated data,  Häge (2008)  calculated that  Council 
working groups and COREPER account respectively for 43% and 22% of the legislative acts, while the remaining 35% 
is evaluated by ministers. In foreign policy, Juncos and Pomorska (2011) argue that around one third of the issues are 
discussed by ministers.
2 Although the distinction between diplomats in Brussels and their counterparts in the national capital is not as strict and 
clear-cut as assumed (since the former may be relocated to the home department after the experience in the EU),  it is 
therefore analytically necessary, and empirically, theoretically and normatively justified.
3 In order to avoid subsequent criticisms and problems, national delegates in Brussels may occasionally ask to receive 
an explicit mandate.
4 Leeway/discretion/autonomy are here only loosely defined, and broadly used to evaluate the degree of freedom these 
officials perceive when negotiating in CFSP/CSDP committees. Although the exact meaning is left to the interviewee,  
they offer indications of the space of manoeuvre Brussels diplomats may have in the CFSP/CSDP decision-making 
process in general.
5 There  are  two  exceptions.  For  logistic  reasons,  national  diplomats  who  are  only  partially  involved  in  Council  
negotiations and who reside in the national capital have been excluded. Only full-timers have therefore been considered. 
The second exception follows the beginning of field research: two specific parties (COREPER II and the Antici Group) 
replied that their handling of CFSP/CSDP issues was extremely limited.
6 The questionnaires were sent between April and July 2008, while the interviews were conducted in July–August 2007 
and May–July 2008. The research was conducted before the treaty of Lisbon came into force (December 2009). In spite  
of the changes that have been introduced in the CFSP/CSDP governance (among others, the creation of the new double-
hatted High Representative of  the  Union for  Foreign  Affairs  and Security Policy and the launch of  the European 
External Action Service), the decision-making rules and logics remain the same: decisions are made by the Council, and 
representatives of EU member states, almost exclusively by unanimity, with a very limited involvement of other actors.  
In  this  vein,  the  most  relevant  innovation  may  concern  the  diminished  role  of  the  rotating  presidency  in  the  
CFSP/CSDP:  the  meetings  of  the  Council  for  Foreign  Affairs,  PSC and working  groups  are  now chaired  almost 
exclusively by the High Representative and her staff. To what extent, and in what ways, this can affect CFSP/CSDP 
negotiations, is uncertain and requires further investigation.
7 Table not reported.
8 Tables not reported.
9 Interview(6), Belgian official, May 2008.
10 Interview(8), French official, May 2008. For similar statements, see Juncos and Pomorska 2006; Juncos and Reyn-
olds 2007.
11 Interview(6), Belgian official, May 2008. 
12 Interview(17), CIVCOM official, July 2008.
13 The 138 cases of the research have been divided into three categories: a) delegates in CFSP working groups; b)  
delegates in the PSC (and those working closely with them – Nicolaidis group – or with the capital, Relex Counsellors); 
c) delegates who deal with CSDP issues. If national officials participate in more than one category, two strategies have  
been pursued: first, their scores have been counted for each group (N=162). Second, to accentuate the variance, only the 
participants in just one of the three groups have been considered (N=108).
14 Interview(11),  Nicolaidis  delegate,  June  2008;  Interview(2),  Italian  official,  August  2007.  However,  a  partial 
explanation may lie in the different kind of scrutiny (ex post versus ex ante) the PSC may experience, as its reports (and 
positions) – dealing with more relevant dossiers – are more likely to be read (ex post) by the capital. On the contrary, 
the outputs of the CWGs, having less significant and immediate consequences, are more likely to be left unchecked ( ex 
post).
15 Other variables can have a role in explaining the variance in the European-domestic nexus. Political  salience is  
certainly one of those. The domestic level may have incentives in leaving PRs more room for manoeuvre (both in the 
formulation of the position, and in the negotiation process) if the issue is little salient (or highly uncontroversial) for a  
country’s foreign policy. In this article, the unit of analysis is the single interviewee/diplomat: it can safely be assumed  
that each of them has handled both more and less politically sensitive dossiers. In other words, political salience can be  
considered as distributed normally among the population of this research.  Furthermore,  whereas  certain groups of 
diplomats are constantly biased in one direction (for instance, the PSC is supposed to deal with more sensitive issues  
than CWGs), the data shown above reveal a different – the PSC has relatively more autonomy – and more complex 
reality, and would suggest further investigation.
16 Both variables are operationalized through the number of years respondents spent, respectively, in the EU; and in  
domestic + international + European professional settings.
17 To operationalize this variable, I relied on the regional governance index prepared by Hooghe and Marks (2001). The 
reference year is 2000, and data are available for the then-fifteen members of the EU. It follows that this variable was 
tested only for these countries.
18 Power is here understood in terms of military capabilities. Koenig-Archibugi (2004) measures member states’ power 
capabilities using the Composite Index of Material Capabilities (CIMC) developed by the Correlates of War Project.  
What is relevant for his analysis is the percentage of power each state possesses in relation to the other EU member  
states rather than to all states in the international system. The same purpose is shared in this research. The reference year 
is 2001. The scale goes from 0.03 (Malta) to 18.82 (Germany).
19 At the same time, Public Opinion – since it measures the same variable as Elite – has been excluded from the second 
regression.
20 The objective is to make the analysis more robust and accurate; on the other hand, the missing cases are random and 
limited.
21 Interview(8), French official, May 2008.
22 Interview(19), Italian official, July 2008.
